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COMMENT
PROMISE AND PROBLEMS IN
DIVORCE MEDIATION
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past two decades, mediation in general has gained increasing
acceptance in the legal community.' "[T]he search for alternative methods of
resolving disputes has burgeoned to 'a movement'." 2 In the divorce context,
particularly, mediation has been seen by some as a more suitable process than the
adversary system. 3 Proponents of mediation assert that the adversary system
involves debilitating expense, frustrating delay, 4 and fails to address the emotional
needs of the parties.5 Adversarial tactics often aggravate rather than resolve
spousal differences, 6 though an amicable settlement might be in the best interests
of both parties, especially when there are children by the marriage.
Despite this potential for emotional resolution and for forestalling mounting
legal expenses, divorce mediation has not attained the scope of implementation its
boosters had expected. 7 Explanations vary. The divorce bar is accused of
guarding its turf; mediators have found it difficult attracting clients; some
commentators say it is merely that change comes slowly;8 other commentators

Mediation is first and foremost a process that emphasizes the participants'
responsibility for making decisions that affect their lives. It is, thus, a
self-empowering process. The process minimally consists of systematically isolating points of agreement and disagreement, developing options, and
considering accommodations through the use of a neutral third-party
mediator whose role is described as that of a facilitator of communications, a guide toward the definition of issues, and a settlement agent who
works toward the definition of issues by assisting the disputants in their
own negotiations.
Milne & Folberg, The Theory and Practiceof Divorce Mediation, DIVORCE MEDIATION 3, 7
(Folberg & Milne eds. 1988).
2. H. DAVIDSON, L RAY & R. HOROWITZ, Preface to ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF FAMILY
DISPUrE RESOLUTION (1982).
3. Friedman & Anderson, Divorce Mediation Strengths..., 3 CAL LAW., July 1983, at 36.
•4. ld; Carbonneau, A Consideration of Alternatives to Divorce Litigation, 1986 U. ILL. L
REV. 1119-22.
5. Carbonneau, supra note 4, at 1130.
6. Id. at 1123.
7. WarringCouples Shun Divorce Mediatorsand Opt to Battle it out in Court hIstead, Wall
St. J., Mar. 27, 1990, § B at 1, col. 4.
8. Id.
1.
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have pointed to unresolved problems in the mediation process itself.9 The
qualifications of mediators, the proper role of mediators and the dynamics of the
mediation are among the factors under examination. 10 Despite these growing
pains, however, divorce mediation will continue to evolve because of the promise
it offers to many divorcing couples.
II. BENEFITS OF DIVORCE MEDIATION
Divorce can be financially devastating. 1 Mediation is perceived to lower
costs associated with an adversarial divorce. 12 When parties tenaciously dispute
each issue for optimum advantage and contest each procedural matter painstakingly, both attorney fees and court costs accumulate.' ° Mediation attempts to avoid
this ruinous contentiousness. According to one source, the median cost of a
mediated divorce is $3428 as compared to a median cost of $4350 for an
adversarial divorce. 14 Additionally, when couples successfully work out an
agreement themselves, they are much more likely to comply with the agreement,
thus avoiding costs of relitigation or modification.1615 This also eases the caseload
of the courts, resulting in savings to the public.
Divorce mediation may also offer the advantage of being faster than an
adversarial divorce. 17 The average time for successful mediation participants is
8.5 months, while the average time for those in the adversarial process is between
10 and 11 months.18 Curbing the time required to obtain a divorce might allow
parties to emotionally recover sooner. Also, as already pointed out, as divorce
actions are delayed, legal expenses rise.
A further benefit typically attributed to mediation is that it gives the parties
control of their own destinies and allows flexibility in reaching solutions more
appropriate to their unique needs. 19 In an adversarial context, clients often feel
20
powerless as responsibility for decision-making is passed to their lawyers.

9. See generally Gorbein & Bookholder, Divorce Mediation: What are the Options? Where is
it Heading?, 63 Micit. B.J. 1137 (1984); Erlanger, Chambliss & Malli, Participationand Flexibility
in Informal Processes: Cautionsfrom the Divorce Context, 21 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 585, 590
(1987) [hereinafter Erlanger]; Crouch, Mediation and Divorce: The Dark Side is Still Unexplored,
4 FAm. ADvoc. no. 3, 27 (1982).
10. See infra notes 31-55 and accompanying text.
11. See generally Da Silva, The Dollarsand Sense of Settling Cases: The Mounting Costs of
Litigation Can-Make Clients See the Virtue of Not Going to Trial, 4 FAM. ADVOC. no. 3, 2 (1982).
12. Carbonneau, supra note 4, at 1119. But see infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
13. Carbonneau, supra note 4, at i119-22.
14. Wall St. J., Mar. 27, 1990, § B at 1, col. 6.
15. Pearson & Thoennes, Mediation and Divorce: The Benefits Outweigh the Costs, 4 FAM.
ADvoc. no. 3, 26, 32 (1982).
16. Id. at 28-29.
17. Id. at 29.
18. Id.
19. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 01110 ST. U. 29, 34 (1982).
20. Friedman & Anderson, supra note 3, at 36.
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Often the lawyers' adversarial postures escalate tensions, though the parties may
not desire this and though it may be counter-productive. 2 1 The sense of
empowerment which mediation gives the clients can pay dividends. In divorce
mediation,
the general form and structure of the process are molded to the
specificity of the individual situation. Although the mediator provides
pace and guidance, the spouses retain ultimate control over the process.
The fact that the final result is the product of personal involvement, and
largely self-determined, facilitates initial and continuing compliance
with the mediated agreement. These circumstances, in turn, lessen the
22
possibility of reconsideration or litigation.
Child custody and visitation are common areas in which mediation's
flexibility is applied. 23 The idea is that the parties themselves are in the best
24
position to know what they hope to gain and what they are willing to give up.
Mediation may also offer the advantage of reducing emotional stress and
addressing emotional needs the legal system is not designed to serve. 25 Thus,
mediation is particularly applicable to the dissolution of marriage. The severance
of an intensely intimate relationship such as marriage can create tremendous
anxiety which, unaddressed, may later complicate the proceedings. Mediation
allows for resolution of emotional issues while preserving mutual respect and
avoiding blame. 26 For this reason, divorce mediation is preferable to an
adversarial contest because it:
acknowledges that the emotions associated with divorce are an integral
part of the resolution process and must be recognized. Mediation
provides for an airing of emotional issues even if irrelevant to the court
proceedings. Therefore these feelings can be managed in mediation so
they are not merely suppressed, only to surface later in the form of
2
postdivorce litigation.
Mediation might also reduce stress by preventing runaway legal costs,
reducing incessant delay with its concomitant uncertainty, and averting the
escalation of counsels' combativeness beyond the wishes of the parties.

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

id.
Carbonneau, supra note 4, at 1169.
Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 15, at 32.
Friedman & Anderson, supra note 3, at 38.
Carbonneau, supra note 4, at 1130.
Wall St. J., Mar. 27, 1990, § B at 1, col. 4.
Milne & Folberg, supra note 1, at 8.
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III. SHORTCOMINGS OF DIVORCE MEDIATION
Notwithstanding the many praises mediation has received, any movement to
supplant the adversary system has stalled. 8 The process has not proven to be
a panacea. 29 Problems exist with divorce mediation that must be resolved if the
30
area is to grow.
One problem is a shortage of qualified mediators. 31 Although the field
32
abounds with mediators, many don't have the requisite knowledge and training.
The majority of mediators at present have backgrounds in social work and
psychology. 33 These mediators are unable to competently advise their clients on
such things as property division, tax consequences, pensions, alimony and many
other legal issues common in divorce. 34 Also, mediators without a legal
background will not be able to properly conduct the thorough discovery essential
to informed negotiating. 35 Divorce is a legal process which may result in a final
decision. 36 Without knowledgeable
counsel, clients risk costly mistakes and may
37
unknowingly forfeit legal rights.
Difficult problems arise defining the lawyer-mediator's proper role as
39
well.3 8 Traditionally, a lawyer's duty of loyalty has been to his client.

28. Wall St. J., Mar. 27, 1990, § B at 1, col. 6.

29. For a scathing condemnation of divorce mediation, see Summers, The Case Against Lay
Divorce Mediation, 57 N.Y. ST. B. J. no. 4, 7 (1985).
30. See generally Crouch, supra note 9.

31. Carbonneau, supra note 4, at 1171.
32. Gombein & Bookholder, supra note 9, at 1137.
33. Carbonneau, supra note 4, at 1172.
34. Gombein & Bookholder, supra note 9, at 1137.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1138.
37. However, attempts to provide each party with independent counsel within the mediation
will not only increase costs, but may defeat the purpose of mediation by injecting an adversarial
element.
38. The ABA has attempted to address this by adopting the following rule:
(a) A lawyer may act as intermediary between clients if:
(1) the lawyer consults with each client concerning the implications
of the common representation, including the advantages and risks involved, and the effect on the attomey-client privileges, and obtains each

client's consent to the common representation;
(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the matter can be resolved
on terms compatible with the clients' best interests, that each client will

be able to make adequately informed decisions in the matter and that there
is little risk of material prejudice to the interest of any of the clients if the
contemplated resolution is unsuccessful; and
(3) the lawyer reasonably believes that the common representation
can be undertaken impartially and without improper effect on other
responsibilities the lawyer has to any of the clients.
(b) While acting as intermediary, the lawyer shall consult with each client
concerning the decisions to be made and the considerations relevant in making them,

so that each client can make adequately informed decisions.
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However, in divorce mediation, the lawyer-mediator might be representing both
or neither of the parties, thus obscuring where his loyalty must lie. 40 Various
legal organizations have struggled to define the lawyer-mediator's role in this
situation. 41 The "common representation" method allows the mediator to render
legal advice to the parties, but lessens the mediator's effectiveness because the
mediator may be preoccupied with conflict of interest concerns. 42 The "nonrepresentation" method does not allow representation of either party, but has the
advantage of freeing the mediator to focus on facilitating settlement. 43 Because
44
of confusion in roles, many lawyers are not receptive to mediation.
Another shortcoming of mediation is the potential for exploitation of one
party due to unequal bargaining power. 45 The same flexibility and party control
that makes mediation an advantage can be a detriment when one party uses it to
manipulate the other.46 Thus, when neither party has counsel, as is typically the
case, 47 the party with superior negotiating skill may dominate the mediation
48
session.
Unequal bargaining power may also result from having insufficient financial
resources to fully pursue the divorce. 49 As financial pressures build, a settlement may not be conceived by mutual agreement, but rather imposed by fiat by
the more secure party. 50 In one case, a woman was forced to sign a mediated
settlement when her husband withheld support payments: "I had to say that I was
signing this freely, which of course was a lie because at this point my mortgage
payment was six days past due, and [his] lawyer was standing there with the check
in his pocket saying 'Sign or you don't get the money."' 5 1 Although this
coercion could occur in an adversarial divorce as well, this example illustrates that

(c) A lawyer shall withdraw as intermediary if any of the clients so requests, or
if any of the conditions stated in paragraph (a) is no longer satisfied. Upon withdrawal, the lawyer shall not continue to represent any of the clients in the matter that was
the subject of the intermediation.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCr Rule 2.2 (1983).
39. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILTry EC 5-1 (1990).
40. Comment, Model Rule 2.2 and Divorce Mediation: Ethics Guideline or Ethics Gap?, 65
WASH. U.LQ. 223 (1987).
41. See generally Riskin, Toward New Standardsfor the Neutral Lawyer in Mediation, 26
ARIz. L REv. 329 (1984).

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
(1983).
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 342-43.
Id.
Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, supra note 19, at 41.
Erlanger, supra note 9, at 597.
Id.
Wall St. J., Mar. 27, 1990, § B at 1, col. 5.
Diamond & Simborg.... and Weaknesses [of Divorce Mediation], 3 CAL LAW. 37
Erlanger, supra note 9, at 592.
Id.
Id. at 593.
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the assumption that mediation produces mutually acceptable agreements is not
accurate in all scenarios.
52
Emotional vulnerability is another form of unequal bargaining power.
Though the intimate nature of marriage is supposed to make divorce ideal for
mediation, it may actually impede a fair agreement. 53 The decision to divorce
may not be mutual; the rejected partner may be too agreeable in hopes of winning
back the spouse, or the divorcing spouse may be too generous due to feelings of
guilt.54 Alternatively, the rejected partner may seek vengeance.5 5
Unequal bargaining power may also occur due to the impatience of one party
to settle. 56 This impatience might be attributable to a desire to pursue another
relationship, a desire to sever contact with the spouse, or simply a desire for a
return to normalcy. 57 Whatever the reason, the opposing spouse can manipulate
this desire to wring additional concessions at mediation. Many mediation
proponents agree that for mediation to work, the parties must have roughly equal
bargaining power. 58 If one party is at a disadvantage, whether it be emotionally,
financially, or otherwise, the mediation will likely not achieve its purposes.
59
Instances of spouse abuse, for example, should not be submitted to mediation.
Another criticism of divorce mediation is that actual experience has cast
doubt on the assumption that mediation would necessarily save parties time and
money. Studies by Jessica Pearson and Nancy Thoennes conclude that "mediation
does not initially result in substantial or consistent savings to the clients." 60 In
fact, mediation proved to be more expensive when the parties were subsequently
unable to reach an agreement.
"The average legal fee paid by successful
mediation-group respondents was $1324. For unsuccessful mediation-group
respondents, it was $1544. And for [those who rejected mediation], it was
$1296., ' 62 Additionally, whereas successful mediation saved the most time,
unsuccessful mediation took longer to resolve than a purely adversarial proceeding;
the adversarial proceeding took between 10 and 11 months, but unsuccessful
mediation averaged 14.2 months to complete. 63 Thus, if success could be
predicted, mediation would result in savings of time and money, but absent such
foresight, the parties risk costlier, lengthier proceedings. It should be noted,
though, that the instances of relitigation, and thus subsequent expense, were less

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
Id.
Diamond & Simborg, supra note 48.
See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
Erlanger, supra note 9, at 594.
Id.
Carbonneau, supra note 4, at 1176.
Id.
Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 15, at 26.
Id. at 28.
Id.
Id. at 29.
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with the successful mediation. 64 Research statistics indicate that 21% of those
who had successfully mediated returned to court for modifications or enforcement
the adversarial couples, 36%
and only 6% returned to court twice, whereas among
65
returned to court once and 13% returned twice.
Perhaps the largest obstacle to divorce mediation is the attitude of the
consuming public. 66 First, couples must have a good-faith willingness to settle
in order for mediation to work. 67 During the emotional tribulations of divorce,
many people cannot react rationally. A vengeful spouse can compromise the
fairness of mediation 68 and this might ultimately remove the emotional healing
and voluntary compliance benefits of mediation. Second, although mediation is
now accepted by many in the legal community, most divorcing couples respond
more traditionally.69 For example, in Los Angeles, "fully half the disputants..
. who were offered free mediation services to resolve contested child custody and
visitation matters rejected the offer." 70 Indeed, "the divorce mediation programs
71
with the highest participation rates are compulsory services housed in courts."
"The problem is getting clients," says Robert Coulson, president of the
American Arbitration Association. "Not many family mediators are
making a substantial living from it." He says that despite a burgeoning
professional interest, his organization hasn't found a ready way to
weave divorce into its marketing efforts ....
Some of the public resistance became clear early on. In doing a
marketing survey on divorce mediation some seven years ago, Joel
Shawn, a San Francisco divorce mediator and attorney, found "the
general response was 'It's a terrific idea. It's needed. It's wonderful."'
But when the same people were asked what they would do if divorcing,
"They 2said, 'I'd get the meanest person in the valley to rip his throat
out.'

7

64. Id. at 26.
65. Pearson & Thoennes, Divorce Mediation: An Overview of Research Results, 19 COLuM.
J.L & SOC. PROBS. 451, 471 (1985).
66. Carbonneau, supia note 4, at 1175.
67. Id. at 1171.
68. Diamond & Simborg, supra note 48, at 37.
69. Typically those who are receptive to divorce mediation are "younger, well-educated,
usually professional and materially comfortable." Carbonneau, supra note 4, at 1176.
70. Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 65, at 454.
71. Id.
72. Wall St. I., Mar. 27, 1990, § B at 9, col. 1.
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IV: HARMONIZING MEDIATION WITH THE ADVERSARIAL PROCESS
Divorce mediation should be made fully available for those who want it, but
it should be recognized that mediation is not appropriate in all cases. 73 The
public should be educated as to its availability. "[S]ays John Haynes, a New York
mediator,74'It will take another 10 years for people to think of mediation as a first
choice"'
Ironically, though public reluctance to accept divorce mediation is a large
factor in its present lull, many of those who have participated in the process are
pleased with the results. 75 According to a study by Pearson and Thoennes, 70%
of the individuals who successfully mediated were "highly satisfied" with the
process, 92% would recommend it to a friend and 93% would be willing to
mediate again. 76 Perhaps more remarkable, of the individuals whose mediation
was not successful, 64% would be willing to mediate again and 81% would
recommend the process to a friend.77 A majority of the successful mediation
participants reported that the process had improved communication and cooperation with their ex-spouse and had reduced their own anger. 78 This, in turn,
increases voluntary compliance with the agreement and reduces subsequent
79
litigation.
Many of the problems with mediation might be averted if the public is
educated. For example, mediation can actually be more expensive and timeconsuming when it proves to be unsuccessful, 80 but when parties are knowledgeable about mediation, they can evaluate for themselves whether they are likely
candidates for the process. Additionally, many of the problems with mediation are
not peculiar to that process, but rather also exist in the adversarial process.
Impatience to settle, for example, can result in an unfavorable disposition in the
adversary system as well as in mediation. Educated couples would be better able
to weigh these factors.
Commentators have debated what factors are best able to predict success for
mediation. 81 Some have focused on the mediator's style and role, whereas

73. For example, mediation is not appropriate in cases of physical abuse of one spouse by
another.
74. Wall St. J., Mar. 27, 1990, § B at 1, col. 4.
75. See notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
76. Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 15, at 33.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See supra notes 15, 64-65 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
81. See generally Kressel, Jaffee, Tuchman, Watson & Deutsch, A Typology of Divorcing
Couples: Implications for Mediation and the Divorce Process, 19 FAM. PROCESS 101 (1980);
Kochan & Jick, The Public Sector Mediation Process: A Theory and EmpiricalExamination, 22 J.
CONFLUCr RESOLUTION 209, 219 (1978); W. Felstiner & L Williams, Community Mediation in
Dorchester, MA: Final Report (Soc. Sci. Research Inst., Univ. of S. Cal., 1979-80).
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others have examined the preexisting characteristics of the disputants.8 2 One
study found the important factors to include the mediator's ability to facilitate
communication, the disputants' perception of the mediator, the duration and
magnitude of the dispute, and the relationship between the disputants. 83 Though
the study gives some insight into preexisting characteristics which might aid in
screening couples for mediation, the study concludes "that mediators' actions play
a key role in determining the success of the process [and] underscore
the need for
84
mediator training and experience rather than case screening."
85
Mediation education is also needed for lawyers if the field is to thrive.
Interdisciplinary training in both the legal and mental health fields would give the
lawyer-mediator a wider array of tools with which to serve clients.'O With
education, lawyer-mediators could better compensate for unequal bargaining power
in a session. 87 Educated lawyers who are not mediators could more competently
make referrals for appropriate couples. Such education programs have increased 8 and likely will continue to increase.8 9
It has become clear that divorce mediation is not a panacea. For some
couples it offers cheaper, faster, and more satisfactory divorce settlements, but this
does not occur in all cases. 90 Rather than displacing the adversary system,
mediation is best seen as a supplement to it. Couples may still desire the option
of an adjudicated divorce. 91

"The real challenge . . . is to synthesize the

strengths of each model into a broader view of the possibilities for resolving
conflict. Lawyers and lawyer-mediators can neither rely exclusively on their old
92
skills nor abandon them."
STEVEN T.

KNUPPEL

82. Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 65, at 459.
83. Id. at 460.
84. Id. at 461.
85. One article asserts that trial lawyers are a natural choice to become mediators because of
their legal knowledge and their ability to objectively assess a case, to "size up" a witness, to elicit
information from a recalcitrant witness, and to generally orchestrate the proceedings. Gaughan,
How to Avoid Cutting up the Cake: Why Trial Lawyers Make Good Mediators, 24 TRIAL 16
(1988).
86. For a discussion of such a program which has been implemented at the University of Iowa,
see Stier & Hamilton, Teaching Divorce Mediation: Creating a Better Fit Between Family Systems
and the Legal Systems, 48 ALB. L REV. 693 (1984).
87. See Haynes, Mediating with a Powerful Competitive Couple: Michael and Debbie, 1987
Mo. J. Disp. RESOL 27. This article presents specific strategies which the mediator can use to
facilitate communication and concessions between difficult parties. Although the article primarily
focuses on the competitive couple scenario, many of the techniques could be adapted for other
types of couples, such as a couple with significantly unequal bargaining positions.
88. Riskin, supra note 19, at 49.
89. Id. at 51.
90. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
91. Carbonneau, supra note 4, at 1171.
92. Friedman & Anderson, supra note 3, at 38.
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